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Introduction
Successful CO 2 emission abatement requires international cooperation. However, full cooperation in the international environmental agreements (IEAs) seems to be difficult to achieve because of free-riding incentives. Game theoretic approaches are widely used to explore the properties of IEAs (e.g., Barrett, 1994) and the effects of institutional settings aimed to stimulate voluntary participation in the IEAs, for example through transfers (e.g., Carraro and Siniscalco, 1993; Hoel and Schneider, 1997; and Weikard et al., 2006) . A general observation from this literature is that rather small partial coalitions tend to emerge and the coalition with all members may not be attained. For example, Barrett (1994) proves that stable coalitions will be small if the difference between the non-cooperative outcome and the fullcooperative outcome for each region is large. Hoel and Schneider (1997) conclude that letting non-signatories reduce their emissions by means of transfers from signatories will not increase the number of signatories, which implies higher global emissions in the case of transfers than in the case of no transfer. Thus, even with transfers, full cooperation on emission abatement is hard to get established.
To improve these outcomes, a number of studies have proposed to link the agreements on emissions abatement to other economic issues, especially to technological cooperation. The main idea of this mechanism is that each region negotiates not only on emissions abatement but also negotiates on technological cooperation, which might induce regions to join a coalition. For example, Carraro and Siniscalco (1994) indicate that linkage of the IEAs on climate control and technological cooperation may stabilise an IEA, as payoffs of signatories will increase due to increased technological spillovers from other signatories. Carraro and Siniscalco (1997) show that linkage of the environmental agreement with an agreement on technological cooperation may overcome free-riding problems due to the fact that the negotiation on both climate control and technology is more profitable to signatories when benefits from technological cooperation are exclusive to them than the negotiation on climate control only. Kemfert (2004) shows in an applied coalition formation game with four regions that signatories can profit more when they cooperate on emissions abatement and technological innovation than in the case of non-cooperation. Furthermore, there exist incentives for non-cooperating countries, such as the U.S.A., to join an agreement in which countries cooperate both on emissions abatement and technological innovations, because they can obtain technology spillovers, which improve energy efficiency through trade with signatories. Buonanno et al. (2003) define the international spillovers of knowledge generated by a stock of world knowledge. In their setting, international knowledge spillovers affect both the production function and the emission to output ratio. Golombek and Hoel (2005) assume that the technology level of the region depends on own investments in R&D and R&D investment in other countries (signatories) using a certain rate of technology diffusion, and R&D activities in cooperating countries will lower abatement costs in non-cooperating countries due to technology diffusion. The general insight that emerges from these studies is that there are a number of different channels through which technology spillovers may affect the payoffs of regions and thus the incentives to cooperate: (i) global spillovers from a "world stock of knowledge", (ii) spillovers that are directly derived from participation in the agreement (coalitional spillovers), and (iii) spillovers to outsiders. What all these studies lack, however, is a systematic analysis of the influence of technology spillovers on the stability of international climate agreements with heterogeneous players in an applied setting.
Technology spillovers can be (and are) specified in many different ways, depending on the answer to the essential questions such as how to measure technology and how to specify spillovers. Most existing models assume that the level of environmental technology can be approximated by looking at the emission intensity of production, that knowledge can be aggregated over regions through summation, and that spillovers have the effect of pivoting the marginal abatement cost (MAC) curve down. Recent literature suggests, however, that a 'best-shot' aggregation of technology may be more appropriate (Sandler, 2006) . Furthermore, alternative indicators of technology, such as based on energy intensity or carbon intensity, are also found in the applied literature (e.g. Kemfert, 2004) . Finally, Baker et al. (2007) and Bauman et al. (2007) challenge the conventional specification that spillovers (or learning, for that matter) pivot down the MAC curves. Baker et al. (2007) suggest two alternatives: an extension of the MAC curve to the right, and a change in the curvature of the MAC curve.
The purpose of this paper is to investigate how these various technology spillover mechanisms and specifications affect the formation and stability of climate coalitions in a non-cooperative game. To do this, we use an integrated assessment model, STACO Nagashima et al., 2006) . We explore the links between coalition formation and technology spillovers from both sides by investigating how technology spillovers that depend on the coalition that is formed influence the incentive structures to join the coalition.
Moreover, we will examine whether the effects of technology spillovers are large enough to stabilise more ambitious coalitions by offsetting the incentive to free-ride. We simulate 4 several spillover mechanisms and specifications that are available in the literature, to investigate the robustness of these links. To keep the analysis tractable, we leave the issues of a separate technology agreement and endogenous learning effects for further analysis; thus, the spillovers we investigate are all specified as externalities, and there are no endogenous feedback effects from abatement on the state of technology.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides the game theoretic and empirical framework of the STACO model, and introduces technology spillovers in the model. Section 3 reports the main results with technology spillovers, followed by the analysis of alternative specifications of technology in the Section 4. Section 5 provides sensitivity analysis, and Section 6 concludes. The Appendix provides the model parameter values.
The stability of coalitions model (STACO)

Game theoretic background
In this section, we describe the game theoretic model following Finus et al. (2006) and Nagashima et al. (2006) . Our analysis uses a two stage game. In the first stage, regions
,..., 1 = decide whether they sign the agreement or not. Signatories form a coalition and non-signatories remain singletons in the second stage of the game. Then, all regions simultaneously determine their emission abatement levels, The payoff for each region i π is a function of regional benefits it B and regional abatement costs it AC at period t .
Formally, we have:
where q is an abatement matrix of dimension N × ∞ and r is the discount rate. The payoff is calculated as the net present value of the stream of net benefits. We assume that the regional benefits depend on past and current global emission abatement, and the regional abatement costs depend on a region's own current abatement. The regional abatement levels is determined within the abatement strategy space [ ] it it e q , 0 ∈ , where it e denotes emission levels in the business-as-usual (BAU) scenario.
We apply the solution concept of a partial agreement Nash equilibrium between the signatories and singletons Tulkens, 1995, 1997) . We assume that signatories determine their abatement level by maximising the sum of the payoffs of the signatories 5 taking the abatement levels of non-signatories as given. Non-signatories choose their abatement level by maximising their own payoffs taking the other regions' abatement levels as given. This abatement game has a unique interior solution under the STACO specification of benefit and cost functions (see Section 2.2). Moreover, an emission permit trading system is applied among signatories. We define a valuation function
which yields regional payoffs with permit trading given coalition K . The payoff for signatory i after permit trading is defined as follows:
where t p is the permit price in period t , * it q is the optimal abatement in coalition K and it q is the assigned abatement under the permit trading system. The assigned abatement level is determined as the difference between regional BAU emissions and regional emission permits, which are distributed proportional to the regional emission paths .
We refer to the situations where none or one of the regions joins a coalition as 'All
Singletons', and a coalition where all regions cooperate as 'Grand Coalition'.
We call a coalition K stable if the coalition satisfies both internal and external stability.
Internal stability of a coalition means that no signatory has an incentive to withdraw from the coalition. For external stability, we consider a unanimity voting system in which signatories vote on entry of singletons (cf. Bloch, 1997; Finus et al., 2005) . This definition of external stability has two interpretations. First, none of the singletons has an incentive to join the coalition if they are worse off when they are joining. Second, if one has an incentive to join the coalition they are, however, not allowed to enter the coalition if at least one of the signatories becomes worse off.
Formally, the stability concepts are defined as:
Internal stability:
External stability:
Finus and Rundshagen (2003) 
The STACO model
In this section, we present the main issues in the numerical specification of our model, following Finus et al. (2006) and Nagashima et al. (2006) . We consider twelve world regions: Figure A1 ), is based on the data for CO 2 emission derived from the EPPA model (Babiker et al., 2001; Reilly, 2005) and the GDP path is also derived from the EPPA model. Our benefit function is based on avoided damages, calculated using the damage module of the DICE model (Nordhaus, 1994) and the climate module by Germain and Van Steenberghe (2003) . For global damages, we apply the estimate by Tol (1997) that damages amount to 2.7 percent of GDP for a doubling of concentrations over preindustrial levels. Global benefits are allocated according to a fixed share for each region, as displayed in Appendix (Table A2) . We specify an abatement cost function based on the estimates of the EPPA model by Ellerman and Decaux (1998) .
Technology spillovers
Based on the ideas of technology spillovers discussed in the introduction, we identify technology spillovers through three major channels. In the reference scenario, we consider coalition formation in the absence of technology spillovers, and do not assume any 7 technological progress. In the second scenario, we assume global spillovers, which mimics international spillovers of knowledge generated by 'the stock of world knowledge' as in Buonanno et al. (2003) , although our model is much simpler and thus cannot capture the knowledge creation aspect; we rather focus on the link between technology spillovers and incentives to cooperate in an IEA. In this context, the essence of the global spillovers is that every region obtains technology spillovers, irrespective of membership of the coalition or not.
In the third scenario, in addition to the global spillovers, signatories to the climate agreement gain spillovers from the other coalition members (cf. the 'coalition information exchange parameter' in Carraro and Siniscalco, 1997) ; this scenario also refers to the mechanism in Kemfert (2004) that participants cooperate on technological innovation. In the fourth scenario, following Golombek and Hoel (2005) , we consider all possible technology spillovers, i.e., we extend the mechanism of the third scenario with spillovers to singletons.
In our model setting, the size of the technology spillover depends on which regions are member of the coalition. We assume that the spillovers will be higher when more regions are member of the coalition, and when regions with an advanced "state of technology" are member of the coalition. The "state of technology (SoT)" is expressed as the inverse of the regional emission intensity in the reference path, calculated as the Business-as-Usual amount of CO 2 emission per unit of GDP. 2 The rationale of this definition is that regions that have a low emission intensity have a high level of knowledge on GHG abatement strategies. To investigate the robustness of this definition of the state of technology, we introduce some alternative definitions in the next section. As we use the state of technology as an indicator for the level of knowledge, we refer to the emission intensity in the reference path and do not adjust for changes in the emission intensity due to abatement. This is because we feel that abatement primarily reflects a movement along the technology curve, i.e. adoption of existing knowledge, rather than a shift of the curve, i.e. creation of new knowledge. Figure 1 shows the state of technology. We see that throughout the century, Japan has the highest state of technology, followed by EU15. On the other hand, the U.S.A. and China have relatively low states of technology.
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Figure 1: State of Technology based on emission intensity
In our base model, spillovers for region i in period t ( it ς ) are expressed through a summation of state of technology: ξ =0.001. In this case, we assume that a region can also benefit from its own contribution to the coalitional spillovers not as in the case of internal coalitional spillovers, and also outsiders can get some ratio of spillovers from the coalition. Following Carraro and Siniscalco (1997) , we assume that the diffusion rate among coalitions is larger than the one towards outsiders.
In our base model, we adopt the most common assumption on the impact of spillovers and assume that technology spillovers reduce marginal abatement costs over time through a pivoting of the MAC curve:
Results
As we cannot properly estimate the values of the different ξ , our analysis of the results focuses on the impact of spillovers on stability of partial climate coalitions, and a comparison of different specifications, rather than on the detailed numerical outcomes. Nonetheless, it is instructive to start with an analysis of the results of our base model and examine stability for all 4084 coalition structures. Table 1 shows stable coalitions in all scenarios of technology spillovers and associated global net present value of payoffs in billion dollars. We obtain 13 stable coalitions in the cases of no spillovers and global spillovers. Global spillovers do not affect the set of stable coalitions because with global spillovers every region gets the same rate of technological spillovers, irrespective of coalition membership. Thus, while marginal abatement costs are lower and payoffs are higher in presence of the spillovers, the incentives to join or leave a coalition are not significantly influenced. The best performing coalition, in terms of global payoff, is formed by the USA and China: both regions have relatively flat marginal abatement cost curves and can thus abate substantially at relatively low cost. The high benefits accruing to the USA stimulate coalitional abatement, and China can obtain transfers from the USA by selling emission permits. Thus, these two coalition members nicely complement each other. Nagashima et al. (2006) show that a coalition between the USA and China is internally stable but externally unstable under open membership and in absence of spillovers, because Japan has a strong incentive to join the coalition. This accession is blocked, however, under exclusive membership.
Under the internal and extended coalitional spillovers, we have 14 and 11 stable coalitions, respectively. In the coalitional spillover scenarios, Japan and EU15 that have relatively high Clearly, the larger the spillovers are, the higher the net present value of global payoffs. Thus, global spillovers lead to higher payoffs than no spillover for any given coalition structure.
Internal and extended coalitional spillovers further improve payoffs by reducing marginal abatement costs. In all of the stable coalitions, the highest global net present value of payoffs are achieved in the case of extended coalition spillovers since singletons can benefit from the spillovers generated by the coalition members; this boosts payoffs but may reduce incentives to join the coalition (though in our setting, these incentives are not changed sufficiently to alter the set of stable coalitions). For these four scenarios, we can conclude that only relatively small stable coalitions emerge, that achieve only small reductions in the stock of CO 2 . Apparently, the spillovers are not strong enough to stabilise larger and more ambitious coalitions.
Next, we evaluate the impact of the technology spillovers on regional abatement levels. Table   2 show the stock of CO 2 and the optimal abatement levels in 2050 as percentage of BAU emissions for the All Singletons and top five stable coalitions (according to the global net present value of payoffs) in the four scenarios. The result for the All Singletons case is given as a reference, and provides good insight into the features of the heterogeneous regions where abatement levels vary widely between regions, indicating widely varying marginal benefits and marginal abatement costs. Without spillovers, the global stock of CO 2 in the All
Singletons case is about 1,456 GtC by the year 2110, which is about 1.7 times the stock level in 2010. With spillovers, the global stock of CO 2 in the All Singletons case slightly decreases to 1,449 GtC by the year 2110, as we assume that at least global spillovers are available in the All Singletons case. Note that as there is no coalition, all three spillover scenarios are identical in the All Singletons case. For each stable coalition, we observe that singletons are hardly affected by the spillovers. This is not surprising, as these are only linked to the coalition members indirectly through the benefits of global abatement; the exception is the scenario with extended coalitional spillovers, where the coalition affects marginal abatement costs of the singletons. In Table 2 , it is clear that this latter effect is quite limited: it is only noticeable for regions EET, China and India who have higher optimal abatement levels in scenario 4 than in scenario 2. For coalition members, the joint welfare maximisation of the coalition implies that their abatement levels are substantially higher than when they act as singleton (although the highest abatement percentages are not necessarily obtained by coalition members). Coalitional spillovers further increase their abatement percentages by lowering marginal abatement costs. Regions such as
China or India will contribute substantially to coalitional abatement, and receive transfers by selling their excess emission permits to their coalition partners. 
Alternative aggregation of technology
In the simulations above, the assumption is made that knowledge ('State of Technology' in our terminology) can be summed over regions to identify the size of the spillovers. According to Sandler (2006) , however, "Knowledge is the quintessential best-shot or better shot public good, where breakthroughs come from concentrating effort and building up research centers of excellence". Therefore, we can construct an alternative spillover formulation where we follow Sandler's definition and define spillovers through a best-shot aggregation of technology. The implication of the best-shot aggregation (Hirshleifer, 1983; Sandler, 2006) is that the technology spillovers depend on the maximum state of technology in a coalition, rather than the sum of technologies. In the field of GHG abatement technologies, the rationale for the best-shot aggregation is that the technologies that regions have to reduce emissions will have substantial (or even full) overlap with the technologies in other regions.
Consequently, the region with the highest state of technology will not learn from others.
In this section, we explore the effects of best-shot aggregation on the stability of coalitions under the internal and extended coalitional spillovers. To reflect a region's capability of adopting advanced technology, we modify the spillover specification in equations (5) and (6) such that the spillover depends on the difference between the highest state of technology and the region's own state of technology.
Hence, the spillovers 3 can be defined as follows; 
X X X X 5373 X Note: Base case indicates the case of extended coalitional spillovers. X denotes instability of the coalition. Table 4 shows the global net present value (NPV) of payoffs with the best-shot technology aggregation (assuming extended coalitional spillovers). For each coalition, payoffs are somewhat lower than in the base case, because the spillovers are smaller (compare equations 9 and 10 with 5 and 6). In contrast to the base model specification, the highest global NPV of payoffs is obtained in the coalition between EU15 and China. The result suggests that as China can learn more from the EU15 than from USA, cooperation with the EU15 is now more successful (in terms of global abatement levels) than with the USA. We get twelve stable coalitions where the ten stable coalitions are the same as in the base case of extended coalitional spillovers, but the new coalitions Japan & FSU, and Japan & ROW emerge, while the coalition Japan & EU15 & DAE is not stable anymore. The results suggest that the bestshot technology induces participation if the partner is the highest state of technology holder, Japan. But the main conclusion is that the aggregation method does not change the qualitative outcomes of the analysis.
Alternative indicators for state of technology
In this section, we consider alternative indicators for state of technology, using energy 4 intensity or carbon intensity instead of emission intensity. Energy intensity is calculated as energy use per unit of GDP, whereas carbon intensity is calculated as the amount of CO 2 emitted per unit of energy. Emission intensity is used among others by Carraro and Siniscalco (1997) , while Kemfert (2004) uses energy intensity. Table 4 also shows the stable coalitions with these alternative indicators of state of technology. With the state of technology based on energy intensity, we obtain the same stable coalitions as in the base case. This is because the regional trends of energy intensity are similar to the trends of the emissions-output ratio. In contrast, with the state of technology based on carbon intensity, some of the stable coalitions are the same but additionally different stable coalitions emerge. In our model, emission-output ratios and energy intensities decrease over time, but this is not the case for carbon intensity.
This shows that while emission intensity and energy intensity are more or less interchangeable as indicator of the state of technology in addressing climate change, carbon intensity is a relatively poor indicator because of the missing link to economic activity, and using it may lead to misleading conclusions.
Alternative effects of spillovers on the MAC curve
The effect of technology spillovers and learning on the shape of the marginal abatement cost (MAC) curve is hardly ever subjected to a thorough analysis, even though suspicion of the effect of technical change on marginal abatement costs was already put forward more than 20 years ago by Downing and White (1986) . Recently, two papers emerged, Baker et al. (2007) 18 and Bauman et al. (2007) , that challenge the conventional assumption that technical change will pivot the MAC curve down. Bauman et al. (2007) takes up the argumentation of Downing and White (1986) and show that in certain circumstances technical change may even increase marginal abatement costs. Baker et al. (2007) review the literature and derive that different technology options will have a different impact on marginal abatement costs.
Following Baker et al. (2007) , we adopt two alternatives to our base model: (i) technology spillovers will extend the MAC curve to the right, and (ii) technology spillovers will affect the curvature of the MAC curve.
In model terms, this implies that we separate the effects of the spillovers on the two parts of our MAC function (eq. (8) in Section 2.3). In the base case, a spillover will reduce both parameters α and β. We approximate an extension of the curve to the right as a spillover effect that will only affect parameter α (to the same extent as in the base model), leaving parameter β unchanged. This implies that the initial slope of the MAC curve is unchanged, but the curvature is reduced. In the alternative with a changed curvature, we assume that technology spillovers will reduce the initial slope of the MAC curve, but increase the curvature (where we assume the effect is smaller but not insignificant). In mathematical notation, we have:
Base model:
Extension:
Change curvature:
The main results of these alternative specifications can be found in the last two columns of Table 4 . We observe that largely, the same stable coalitions emerge. In the alternative specifications the total spillover effect is somewhat smaller than in the base model (as the effect on β is missing, and the effect on α is reversed, respectively), but this does not affect best-performing stable coalitions are unaffected, however. Thus, we conclude that while the impact of the technology spillover cannot be ignored, the qualitative conclusions still hold.
Alternative levels of spillovers between coalition members ( C ξ )
We suspect that larger technology spillovers among signatories, by increasing the coefficient of intra-coalitional technology spillovers, may enhance larger stable coalitions. The larger spillovers induce signatories to stay in the coalition, and thus additional internally stable coalitions are expected to emerge. The large coalitional spillovers attract potential new entrants because coalition members can get higher benefits from increased abatement by reducing emissions at lower costs than in the base model.
We examine stability of all coalitions using different values of coalitional spillovers, moving from 0.005 to 0.05 in ten steps. The results of these calculations are summarized in Figure 3 , which shows the net present value of global payoffs for all stable coalitions. will successfully join these two regions to form a more ambitious stable coalition: the rather high level of technology in the EU15 makes it an attractive partner when the spillovers generated by this coalition are large enough.
The entry of regions with lower abatement costs, such as China, can be blocked by some of the coalition members because the entry decreases the payoffs for regions with moderate marginal costs/low marginal benefits, which makes the coalition externally stable. It should be noted however that this grouping of regions may be affected by the type of transfer mechanism adopted in the model (emission permits; as Nagashima et al., 2006 , show, the type of transfer scheme does not affect the major qualitative conclusions, but does matter for which regions will successfully form a coalition). The conclusion can be drawn that larger coalitional spillovers may enlarge the coalition, but the effect is rather small and the most effective coalition is not affected at all by the level of spillovers.
Sensitivity analysis
We conduct a sensitivity analysis to examine how the main assumptions affect model results.
We check stability of all coalitions using the open membership rule. In addition, as we believe that a crucial parameter in the model is the discount rate r , and this is subjected to a sensitivity analysis as well. 
"O" indicates a stable coalition; X denotes instability of the coalition.
As in Section 4, we refer to the scenario with state of technology based on emission-output ratio, summation of technology over regions, a pivoting effect of spillovers on the MAC curve, exclusive membership and the case of extended coalitional spillovers (with 0.005
) as the base case. Table 5 presents the results of the sensitivity analysis for the base case and the alternative specifications.
First, we assume an open membership rule where non-signatories can join the coalition freely whenever they can obtain a higher payoff by joining the coalition, without the approval by other signatories (d 'Aspremont et al., 1983) .
5 Under the open membership rule, only two stable coalitions, EU15 & China and Japan & India emerge. These results imply that, in line with previous studies (Finus et al., 2005) , stability is sensitive to the membership rule and exclusive membership enhances stability but cannot make large coalitions stable.
5 Formally, the stability concept under open membership is defined as:
Secondly, we change the base value of discount rate r from 2 % to 3% and 1%, respectively, reflecting a higher (lower) rate of time preference. Changing the value of r will decrease (increase) the amount of abatement and global net present value of payoffs as future benefits from abatement are valued lower (higher) , but the set of stable coalitions remains largely the same as the base case.
Discussions and conclusions
In this paper, we explore the effects of the technology spillovers among heterogeneous regions on the stability of possible climate coalitions under permit trading and the exclusive membership rules. We identify technology spillovers through three major channels, and investigate how technology spillovers can influence the region's incentive structure to join the coalition. Compared with the case of no spillovers, global spillovers can generate higher payoffs and global abatement levels, but global spillovers do not increase stability.
By and large, the technology spillovers to the coalitional members increase their incentive to stay in the coalition and their efforts to reduce emissions, which leads to larger global payoffs and lower global CO 2 stock. Moreover, Japan and EU15, with relatively high states of technology, are likely to be members of coalitions because other coalitional members are willing to form the coalition with them to receive the high technology spillovers. On the other hand, the spillovers to outsiders will not significantly influence the incentive to free-ride for outsiders, and thus the set of stable coalitions remains unchanged. To what extent coalitional spillovers will stabilise larger coalitions remains a question for empirical analysis: the stronger the spillovers, the larger the stable coalitions. But the analysis in this paper shows that spillovers between coalition members need to be extremely high to overcome the strong free rider incentives that prevail in the international climate negotiations. 
Appendix
